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1. Introduction  
A series of studies has established that the welfare cost of market power is marginal. The well-known 
article by Harberger (1954) estimates that the welfare cost of distortions in the allocation of consumer 
goods due to market power amounts to about 0.3 percent of GNP in the US economy. Based on a 
series of later articles, Sherer and Ross (1990), assess the welfare cost to be between 0.5 and 2 percent 
of GNP. However, this literature has neglected to assess the welfare cost of distortions in supply of 
resources, in particular the effects on the supply of labor. Market power in product markets generates a 
wedge between the price of consumer goods and marginal costs and hence widens the wedge between 
the social marginal product of labor and the net of tax real wage received by workers. Such distortions 
are known to be costly due to the substantial tax wedge in the labor market. In fact, Browning (1997) 
found that the welfare cost from distortions in labor supply due to market power in product markets, is 
5-15 times larger compared to the welfare cost created by distortions between consumer goods. 
Browning (1997), however, does not consider effects of market power possessed by intermediate good 
producers. Such market power generates a markup wedge between the price and the marginal cost of 
intermediate goods, which generates an additional wedge between the marginal product of labor and 
the real wage received by workers. Hence, the welfare cost of market power created by distortions in 
the labor supply is likely to be underestimated when the market power of intermediate good firms is 
omitted.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature by calculating the welfare cost of market power in product 
markets in an economy where intermediate good firms and a share of the consumer good firms possess 
market power. The welfare cost of distortions in the supply of labor created by market power of firms 
is found to be more than 40 times larger than the welfare cost of distortions in the allocation of 
consumer goods created by differences in market power of firms. Hence, the welfare cost is substantial 
compared to previous estimates.  
 
The magnitude of this welfare cost is to a large extent determined by the magnitude of the total wedge 
created in the labor market. The magnitude of this wedge is determined by the size of markup factors 
employed, and the magnitude of firms with market power. The wedge created by intermediate good 
firms consists of an accumulation of firm level markup factors. The markup factors are accumulated as 
the price of an intermediate good purchased by another intermediate good firm contains a markup 
factor. The flow of intermediate goods between intermediate good firms is substantial in industrialized 
countries, hence, a sequence of intermediate good firms have added a markup factor to the price of an 
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intermediate good that is purchased by a consumer good firm. This accumulation of firm level markup 
wedges generates a substantial wedge in the labor market, which contributes to explain the substantial 
welfare cost of market power found in this study.  
 
The model in Browning (1997) is extended with intermediate good producers with market power. The 
production function of the two consumer goods is Leontief, where inputs are labor and an intermediate 
good. The production function of these intermediate goods is Leontief, where inputs are labor and 
another intermediate good etc. This production structure incorporates the effect where markup factors 
of intermediate good firms accumulate to a wedge in the labor market adding to effective taxes of 
labor income. The allocation of consumer goods is distorted by market power because only on of the 
goods is sold by firms with market power. All other aspects of the model are identical to the model in 
Browning (1997).  
 
The welfare costs are found by calculating the area of the deadweight loss triangles created by market 
power. The welfare cost associated with distortions in the allocation of consumer goods consists of the 
area of the deadweight loss triangle in the product market diagram, which is equivalent to the 
"Harberger triangle". The welfare cost associated with distortions in the supply of labor consists of the 
area of the deadweight loss triangle in the labor market diagram that is created by market power. 
Sensitivity tests, however, shows that such welfare costs is sensitive to parameter values that are 
difficult to pinpoint due to uncertainty connected to empirical estimates. The welfare cost is more than 
doubled when the firm level markup factor or the compensated labor supply elasticity is doubled.     
 
The findings in this study are likely to affect a series of tradeoffs in public policy. First, the optimal 
design of patent protection policy, see e.g. Nordhaus 1969, 1972, and Scherer, 1972, are based on a 
tradeoff between costs created by distortions due to market power, and gains connected to positive 
external effects associated with R&D activities, see e.g. Romer, 1990a, and Aghion and Howitt, 
1992a. The welfare costs identified in this study is likely to alter this tradeoff, and hence, contribute to 
reduce the net welfare gain of patent protection policies. The welfare effects of a merger usually 
involves welfare gains connected to cost reductions, and welfare costs connected to creation of market 
power, see e.g. Saloner (1987). This study identify a welfare cost of market power previously 
neglected by the literature, hence, the net welfare gain of mergers are likely to drop due to this newly 
discovered welfare cost. The markup wedge identified in this study unveils a welfare cost of raising 
more tax revenue, as taxation is more costly with a larger total wedge in the labor market (see e.g. 
Goulder and Williams, 2003). The study also suggests that the welfare cost of intermediate goods 
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taxation is substantial. The firm level wedges created by intermediate goods taxation is likely to 
generate the same effects as the markup wedges, and hence, accumulate to a costly tax wedge on labor 
earnings.  
 
Section 2 presents the model framework. The distortion in the allocation of consumer goods is 
analyzed in section 3, while section 4 analyzes the distortion created in the labor market. Some 
sensitivity tests are conducted in section 5. Section 6 concludes.   
2. The model framework  
The extent of market power varies among different industries and markets, depending on the structure 
of competition in the different markets. A common feature of these markets is that the price of 
products exceeds the marginal cost of producing these products. Market power in consumer good 
markets creates a wedge between the price and the marginal cost of these goods. Consumer goods, 
however, is produced by firms that use a substantial amount of intermediate goods. Market power in 
intermediate goods markets creates a wedge between the price and the marginal cost of an 
intermediate good, which constitutes an additional wedge between the price of the final good and the 
actual cost of producing the final good. Moreover, intermediate goods producers employ other 
intermediate goods in their production process. Market power in these intermediate good markets will 
generate an additional wedge between the price and the marginal cost of producing consumer goods. 
The massive flow of goods and services between firms implies that consumer goods are produced 
using a chain of intermediate goods. A chain of intermediate good producers with market power at 
every stage will create a chain of wedges that accumulates to a wedge between the price of a consumer 
good, and the marginal cost of producing this good. These features of market power are incorporated 
into the model presented below.  
2.1 The model 
There are to consumer goods produced in the economy, X and Y. The production function of the two 
consumer goods is Leontief, with inputs of labor and an intermediate good. The production function of 
these intermediate goods is also Leontief, with inputs of labor and another intermediate good etc. The 
production of intermediate good i is given by 
(1)  1
1 1
min ,
1α α +
 
=  
− i i ix l x ,  
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where i = 1,.., ∞ . 1+ix  denotes the amount of intermediate good i+1 used in the production of 
intermediate good i, while il  denotes the amount of labor used in the production of intermediate good 
i. The production of consumer goods is given by 
(2)  1,
1 1
min ,
1α α
 
=  
− j j jx l x ,  
for =j X  and Y. jx  denotes the amount consumer good j produced, and 1, jx  denotes the amount of 
intermediate good 1 used in the production of consumer good j. The unit cost of intermediate good i is 
given by  
(3) 1(1 )α α += + −i M ic w p , 
where 1+ip  denotes the price of intermediate good i+1, Mw  denotes the wage rate paid to workers, and 
α is a factor that determines the share of wage costs. The intermediate goods are sold at a price that 
exceeds the unit cost by the same markup factor, M.  
(4)  = +i ip M c   
Equation (3) and (4) can be combined to form an infinite geometric series. After some manipulation, 
the geometric series can be written as  
(5)  1 α= + M
Mp w  
The unit cost, c, of producing consumer goods is identical since both goods are produced by the same 
technology.  
(6)  1(1 )α α= + −Mc w p . 
The price of consumer good X, Xp , exceeds the unit cost by a markup factor of M due to markup 
pricing, i.e.  
(7)  = +Xp M c   
The price of consumer good Y, Yp , equals the unit cost, i.e.  
(8)  =Yp c    
Inserting equation (5) and (6) into equation (7) and (8) gives  
7 
(9)  
α
= +X M
Mp w  
and 
(10)  (1 )α
α
−
= +Y Mp M w . 
The wedges created between the price of consumer goods and the wage rate in equation (9) and (10) 
are generated by a sequence of markups added by intermediate good firms. The wedge in equation (9) 
is larger than in equation (10) because of the markup factor, M, added by producers of consumer good 
X, while there is no markup factor added by producers of consumer good Y.   
2.2 Quantifying parameters in the intermediate good sector  
A parameter value of α  is chosen to generate a firm level cost share of intermediate goods, and hence, 
a cost share of labor, in line with empirical evidence. A broad based definition of intermediate goods 
is suitable in this study to include all inputs that is produced and sold by firms with market power. 
This definition should include material inputs, investments in real capital, transport costs and to some 
extent energy, as these input factors are goods produced and sold by firms. A rough estimate of the 
average value of α  is found by dividing total wage payments on the gross production value reported 
in national accounts. This method suggests that the wage cost as a share of the unit cost in firms is 
approximately 1/3. Hence, α is set to 1/3, as the price of intermediate goods approximately equates the 
wage rate within the framework used. Note, however, that the cost of intermediate goods as a share of 
the unit cost is lower for intermediate goods further down the sequence of intermediate good firms. A 
sensitivity test is conducted in section 5.2 to illuminate on the effect of implementing other parameter 
values of α. Equation (9) and (10) becomes  
(11)  3= +X Mp M w  
and 
(12)  2= +Y Mp M w  
Equation (11) shows that the accumulated markup wedge between the price of consumer good X and 
the wage rate of the economy is three times larger than the firm level markup factor. Equation (12) 
shows that the accumulated markup wedge between the price of consumer goods Y and the wage rate 
of the economy is twice as large as the firm level markup factor.  
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The construction of intermediate good sectors within the model framework used generates a sequence 
of one-way deliveries of intermediate goods. This specification of sectors do not incorporate cross 
deliveries of goods and services between sectors, however, cross deliveries can be transformed into 
one-way deliveries by employing a more detailed specification of sectors, where each delivery of 
goods is originating from one sector. This choice of sectors capture the effects of markup pricing of 
intermediate good firms and at the same time simplify the calculations in this study.  
 
The number of intermediate good firms involved in producing consumer goods is assumed to be 
infinite. This assumption can be justified by the substantial flow of intermediate goods and services 
between firms, and by the following numerical example. Assume that there are only three intermediate 
good firms involved in producing consumer good X, where the last good is produced by labor only. 
This generates a wedge of 112
27
 
+   M  between the price of consumer good X and the wage rate. 
Hence, the wedge created is almost as large as in the case with an infinite number of intermediate 
good firms. Consequently, assuming a sequence with an infinite number of intermediate good firms is 
not crucial for the wedge created.    
3. The distortion in consumer goods  
This section calculates the welfare cost of distortions in the allocation of consumer goods. It can be 
shown that the formal calculation to arrive at these costs and the magnitude of this type of welfare cost 
is identical to that found in Browning (1997). The welfare cost is identical because the market power 
of intermediate good firms does not alter the wedge created between the prices of consumer good X 
and Y. The wedge between these prices only consists of the firm level markup factor employed by 
producers of consumer good X, as the wedge generated by market power of intermediate good firms is 
identical for each consumer good.  
 
The unit cost of the two consumer goods produced is determined by the markup factor and the wage 
rate in equation (11) and (12), hence the production frontier is linear. With suitable choice of units, the 
production frontier can be expressed as   
(13)  100+ =X Y   
Following Browning (1997), it is assumed that the monetary authorities keep total expenditures on 
both goods equal to 100. The demand functions are given by 
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(14)  1−= XX Cp  
and 
(15)  1(100 ) −= − YY C p  
C is a constant shift parameter determining the allocation of X and Y. These demand functions imply 
that 
(16)  100+ =X Yp X p Y .  
Hence, the nominal GNP always equals 1001. These demand functions are suitable for this study 
because they facilitate interpretations of welfare costs since all figures will be given as a percentage of 
GNP. The subsequent price elasticities are in line with empirical estimates, see Gisser (1989) and 
Worcester (1975).  
 
The wedge between consumer good X and Y is found by subtracting (12) from (11), i.e.  
(17)  − =X Yp p M  
Solving the model numerically determines the magnitude of the effects of monopoly as a function of 
the degree (M) and extent (C) of monopoly power in the economy. Combining equations (14), (15) 
and (17) gives 
(18)  (100 )−− =C C M
X Y
 
Inserting (13) into (15) gives 
(19)  0)10000100()1(1002 =−+−+ CYMMY  
Inserting this solution for Y into (13) gives the expression for X.  
 
The welfare cost of the product mix distortion is given by the Harberger-triangle depicted in figure 1. 
This triangle consists of the area denoted abc, between the demand curves denoted XD  and YD  from 
the point of the market solution, X, to the point where the demand curves intersect, C.   
 
                                                     
1
 Note that GNP equals gross production value minus the value of intermediate goods, where gross production value equals 
sales of both consumer and intermediate goods.  
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Figur 1.    
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The expression for this triangle is 
(20)  ( )= −∫C X Y
X
W p p dS .  
inserting (13), (14) and (15) gives 
(21)  (100 )(100 )
 −
= − 
− ∫
C
X
C CW dS
S S
, 
so that  
(22)  100ln (100 ) ln
100
−   
= + −   
−   
C CW C C
X X
. 
Hence, the welfare cost of the product mix distortion is given for a given set of C and M. Following 
Browning (1997), the welfare cost as a percentage of GNP and the monopoly output, X, is reported for 
a set of parameter values of C and M in table 1. This welfare cost is below 0.3 percent of GNP when 
the firm level markup factor does not exceed 15 percent. The welfare costs in table 1 are identical to 
the welfare costs reported in Browning (1997), however, the welfare costs when the markup factor is 1 
and 5 percent is also included.     
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Table 1. Welfare cost of output mix distortion (measured as a percentage of GNP) 
M 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 
C       
10 0.0004 0.011 0.041 0.087 0.147 0.219 
15 0.0006 0.015 0.058 0.125 0.213 0.318 
20 0.0008 0.019 0.074 0.160 0.273 0.410 
25 0.0009 0.023 0.088 0.190 0.327 0.493 
30 0.0010 0.026 0.099 0.217 0.375 0.568 
35 0.0011 0.028 0.109 0.240 0.416 0.634 
40 0.0012 0.030 0.116 0.258 0.450 0.689 
50 0.0012 0.031 0.125 0.279 0.493 0.764 
60 0.0012 0.030 0.123 0.279 0.499 0.784 
 
Produced quantity of X 
M 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 
C       
10 9.91 9.57 9.17 8.80 8.45 8.13 
15 14.87 14.38 13.81 13.27 12.77 12.30 
20 19.84 19.22 18.49 17.80 17.16 16.55 
25 24.81 24.09 23.22 22.39 21.61 20.87 
30 29.79 28.97 27.98 27.04 26.14 25.28 
35 34.77 33.88 32.80 31.75 30.74 29.77 
40 39.76 38.81 37.65 36.52 35.42 34.36 
50 49.75 48.75 47.51 46.27 45.05 43.84 
60 59.76 58.79 57.56 56.31 55.05 53.79 
 
4. The distortions in the labor market 
4.1 Calculating the deadweight loss 
The welfare costs created by distortions in the supply of labor is found by calculating the change in the 
deadweight loss triangle in the labor market when markup factors are removed. Following Browning 
(1997), it is assumed that both consumer goods possess the same degree of substitutability for leisure 
(see Parry, 1994 for a formal treatment). This assumption simplifies the calculations because the 
distortion in the supply of labor created by markup pricing is determined by the wedge between the 
average marginal product of labor and the pre tax wage rate paid to workers. This wedge equals the 
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sum of the accumulated markup wedges between the price and the unit cost of the two products, 
weighted with their respective market shares, 3 2
100 100
+
X YM M , which equals 2
100
+
MX M  when (13) 
is inserted. The expression for the wedge is found by multiplying (11) with X and (12) with Y, and 
summing these equations and inserting (16). This gives  
(23)  1 2
100 100
+
= = + +X Y M
p X p Y MX M w  
The first and second term on the right hand side of equation (23) amounts to the wedge created by 
market power. The last term, Mw , equals the pre tax wage rate paid to workers. The left hand side of 
equation (23), which equals unity, amounts to the average marginal product of labor when the supply 
of labor is normalized to 100. This follows as the numerator on the left hand side of (23) equals GNP 
(which equals 100) and because the production structure within the framework used can be reduced to 
an aggregate production function with a constant unit cost where labor is the only input factor. Hence, 
the wedge created by market power equals  
(24)  2
100
= +
MX
n M . 
This markup wedge equals the monopoly profit as a share of GNP. The first term on the right hand 
side is due to markup pricing in the consumer good sector, and the last term is due to markup pricing 
in intermediate good markets. Browning (1997) only incorporates the first term, and hence, 
implements a smaller wedge in the labor market. Implementation of this smaller wedge explains the 
smaller welfare cost of market power found in Browning (1997).    
 
The welfare cost of market power in product markets is illustrated in figure 2. A market solution with 
the markup wedge included is compared with a market solution where the markup wedge is removed. 
Equations (23) and (24) imply that the pre tax wage rate paid to workers, Mw , equals (1 )− n  when the 
markup wedge is included. Income is assumed to be taxed with a rate of m. Hence, the after tax net 
wage rate confronting workers, Nw , equals (1-n)(1-m). The labor supply is normalized to 100. When 
the markup wedge is removed and all other variables are kept constant, the after tax wage rate equals 
(1 )− m . This results in an increase in tax revenues, as both the tax base (L) and the wage rate Mw  
increases. Following Browning (1997), it is assumed that the tax revenue is fixed to the level prior to 
the removal of the markup wedge, hence, the tax rate on income can be reduced to m', and the after tax 
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net wage rate becomes (1 )′− m  with a subsequent labor supply of 2L . The welfare cost of market 
power generated by distortions in the labor market is given by the area ABCD in figure 2.   
 
Figure 2. 
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The calculation of the welfare cost is closely related to the calculation in Browning (1997). The 
compensated labor supply curve ( *s  in figure 1) is given by 
(25)  µ β= + NL w  
The supply curve is calibrated so that the labor supply equals 100 when (1 )(1 )= − −Nw m n . The labor 
supply elasticity is given by β η=Nw
L
 when L = 100. 
 
Hence, 
(26)  100 (1 )(1 )µ β= − − −m n  
and 
(27)  100(1 )(1 )
ηβ =
− −m n
. 
The labor supply curve is determined for given values of m, n and η . 
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4.2 Quantifying parameters connected to market power  
The magnitude of monopoly profit as a share of GNP is determined by the extent, C, and degree, M, of 
market power. The parameter values of these variables should be chosen in line with empirical 
observations. However, the magnitude of monopoly profit should be interpreted within the context of 
the framework used.   
 
Empirical estimates of the price-cost margin of firms classified as firms with market power, 
iii pcp /− , are found to be around 10 percent, while price-cost margins in excess of 15 percent are 
rare (see Scherer and Ross, 1990, and Worcester, 1975)2. Inserting 0,1=M  into equation (24) results 
in a monopoly profit of at least 20 percentage of GNP. However, Scherer (1980) finds that pure profit 
only amounts to 2-3 percent of GNP for the US economy. Consequently, it does not seem to be 
feasible to implement a firm level markup factor in line with empirical observations that generates a 
monopoly profit as a share of GNP that are in line with empirical observations of pure profits as a 
percentage of GNP. However, the model framework used do not incorporate entry costs or variable 
unit costs. A market solution where the monopoly profit in excess of entry costs amounts to 2-3 
percent of GNP is consistent with the size of markup factors found in the empirical literature when 
most of the monopoly profit generated cover fixed entry costs. Such a cost structure is observed in 
many sectors of the economy. This cost structure is not incorporated into the model framework used, 
however, two alternative approaches generates results that are consistent with such a cost structure.  
 
The first approach assumes that the firm level markup factors are constrained to those generating a 
monopoly profit of 2-3 percent of GNP. Such a constraint is incorporated into the study of Browning 
(1997), however, his study only incorporate monopoly profit from consumer good firms. The 
constraint on pure profit together with equation (24) imply that the firm level markup factor, M, is 
lower than 0,015. The welfare cost of market power is calculated for the case where the firm level 
markup factor equals one percent, M = 0,01, which generates a monopoly profit of 2-3 percent of 
GNP. The second approach consists of calculating the welfare cost of market power for a range of firm 
level markup factors, including those found by the empirical literature. However, the removal of 
market power is implemented by setting prices equal to unit costs. This price setting strategy implies 
negative pure profit for firms facing entry costs. Such a solution does not represent a sustainable 
market solution, and hence, should be interpreted as a social planner solution. Consequently, the 
welfare cost derived using this approach should be interpreted as welfare costs from a social planners 
                                                     
2
 The markup factor, M, in this study only constitutes the numerator of the price-cost margin, however, it is a good 
approximation for the price-cost margin within this model.  
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point of view. The welfare costs derived do not represent an estimate where market solutions are 
compared.    
 
The first approach seems to be relevant for the case where output within firms are constant, and 
removal of market power leads to entry of firms with a zero pure profit margin. A constant output 
within firms imply that the firm level markup factor is irrelevant as a measure of the industry level 
wedge created by market power. However, this approach is not satisfactory when removal of market 
power increases the output of firms, and reduces the incentive of firms to enter an industry. The 
second approach seems to be more tractable when the removal of market power is likely to generate an 
expansion of output within firms, while the number of firms is fixed. The procedure used to 
calculation the welfare cost of market power is identical within both these approaches. The two 
approaches differ only with respect to the size of markup factor employed. This study calculates the 
welfare cost of market power for a range of firm level markup factors, and hence, incorporates values 
consistent with both these approaches.     
 
The aim of this study is to quantify the welfare cost of market power possessed by consumer and 
intermediate good firms. The study do not assess to what extent market power is necessary or even 
desirable as a tool to promote and secure entry of firms. The main result of this study holds within a 
range of markup factors. Consequently, the range of markup factors employed is not constrained to 
those generating a monopoly profit as a percentage of GNP that are equal to empirical observations of 
pure profit as a percentage of GNP.  
 
The magnitude of consumer good firms engaged in markup pricing is to a large extent determined by 
the parameter value of C. Empirical studies show that price-cost margins vary among firms and 
industries. The price of goods and services supplied by the public sector is not likely to incorporate a 
markup factor. In fact, many of these goods and services are sold at a price below their unit cost. 
Consequently, it is not obvious which parameter values that should be attached to C. The welfare cost 
of market power is calculated for a range of parameter values of C, which together with M determines 
the amount of consumer goods, X, sold at a price including a markup factor.    
4.3 Distortions when all income is taxed  
The framework used suggests that both monopoly profit and labor income should be included in the 
tax base. First, monopoly profit is likely to be taxed by corporate income taxation in most tax systems. 
Second, when the monopoly profit pays for entry costs, which are not included in the model, this profit 
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is likely to appear as income elsewhere in the economy. These features are incorporated into the model 
by assuming that the tax rate on labor income is identical to the tax rate used to tax monopoly profit. 
The government budget requirement state that   
(28)  2′=mL m L , 
where ′m  is the tax rate when the market power is removed. 
 
Equation (28) combined with the labor supply curve  
(29)  2 (1 )µ β ′= + −L m ,  
determines 2L  and 'm . Inserting for 2L  in (29) gives 
(30)  2( ) ( ) 0β µ β′ ′− + + =m m mL  
The solution of equation (30) is inserted into equation (29), to determine 2L . These solutions 
determine the welfare cost of market power for a given set of values of m, n and η . The expression for 
the welfare cost of market power is found by employing the formula for the area ABCD that marks the 
welfare cost in figure 2, and implementing values found by the formulas above. The welfare cost is 
then given by 
(31)  * 20.5( )( 100)′= + + − −W m m n mn L  
The initial tax wedge, m, equals 0.43. The compensated labor supply elasticity, η , equals 0,3. These 
parameter values are identical to the parameter values used in Browning (1997), which are chosen 
based on a discussion in Browning (1987). Sensitivity tests of parameter values are conducted in 
section 5. Monopoly profit as a share of GNP, n, is determined when the degree (M) and extent (C) of 
market power is given. The welfare cost is calculated for a range of parameter values of C and M.  
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Table 2.  The Welfare cost created by distortions in the supply of labor (measured as a 
percentage of GNP). Uniform taxation of all income. 
M 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 
C       
10 0.361 2.085 5.017   9.179 15.219 24.320 
15 0.369 2.142 5.173   9.504 15.839 25.485 
20 0.378 2.200 5.332   9.841 16.490 26.731 
25 0.386 2.258 5.496 10.190 17.176 28.065 
30 0.395 2.317 5.663 10.553 17.899 29.497 
35 0.403 2.377 5.835 10.931 18.663  
40 0.412 2.437 6.012 11.324   
50 0.430 2.561 6.379    
60 0.448 2.688 6.767    
 
Table 2 shows that the welfare cost is substantial. When the firm level markup factor is 0.1 and C is 
40, the welfare cost is 6.0 percent of GNP. These substantial costs are a result of the substantial wedge 
created by market power in the labor market (see equation (24)). The markup wedge is removed when 
the market power is removed. The removal of market power also contributes to reduce the tax wedge 
in the labor market. The tax wedge is reduced because the tax base is effectively extended when the 
market power is removed as the supply of labor is increased. The welfare cost of product mix 
distortions in table 1 is marginal compared to the welfare cost of the labor supply distortion in table 2.   
4.4 Distortions when all income is taxed, and labor income taxation is progressive  
Most tax systems consist of a progressive taxation of labor income. A progressive taxation of labor 
income will affect the relationship between the wedge in the labor market, and the amount of tax 
revenue generated. A change in this relationship is likely to affect the welfare cost of removing the 
market power in product markets. The welfare cost is affected as the subsequent change in the tax rate 
to preserve tax revenue is altered. This section incorporates progressive taxation of labor income. 
Following Browning (1997), the progressive tax system is incorporated as a flat tax rate on labor 
income in excess of an exemption. In contrast to Browning (1997), the same flat tax rate is 
incorporated on all monopoly profit. Let E be the supply of labor that is effectively exempted from 
taxation, the equal revenue requirement is given by 
(32)  ( )2(1 )( ) ′′′′+ − − = −nLm m n L E m L E , 
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where ′′m  is the tax rate when the market power is removed and 2′′L  is the supply of labor. Hence,  
(33)  ( )2( ) ′′′′− + = −L E m nmE m L E . 
The rest of the equations are unchanged. The tax rate on monopoly profit and labor income from labor 
supply above E is set to 0.43, where the parameter value for E of 28 is taken from Browning (1997). 
The welfare cost is reported in table 3. 
 
Table 3.  The Welfare cost created by distortions in the supply of labor (measured as a 
percentage of GNP). Progressive taxation of labor income 
M 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 
C       
10 0.290 1.738 4.363   8.299 14.237 23.385 
15 0.297 1.788 4.506   8.613 14.855 24.563 
20 0.304 1.837 4.654   8.940 15.506 25.823 
25 0.311 1.888 4.805   9.279 16.192 27.173 
30 0.318 1.939 4.961   9.633 16.917 28.623 
35 0.325 1.991 5.121 10.002 17.683  
40 0.332 2.044 5.286 10.386   
50 0.347 2.152 5.630    
60 0.361 2.264 5.995    
 
These results show that the welfare cost is still substantial. The welfare cost of labor supply distortions 
is between 4.3 and 6.0 percent of GNP, when the markup factor at the firm level is 10 percent. The 
welfare cost is slightly lower compared to the case with proportional taxation since the removal of 
market power leads to a smaller tax rate reduction in the case with progressive taxation. The tax rate 
reduction is smaller because the removal of market power increases the pre tax wage rate. The 
increased pre tax wage rate contributes to increase the amount of untaxed labor income and the tax 
rate required to preserve the tax revenue is higher. Hence, removal of market power in the case with 
progressive taxation generates a slightly smaller welfare gain compared to the case with uniform 
taxation. Browning (1997) reports an increase in the welfare cost of monopoly power due to 
progressive taxation of labor income. However, his study exempt taxation of monopoly profit and this 
explain the difference in results.    
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When the progressive tax system is introduced by taxing monopoly profit and labor income with the 
same rate, and subtracting a fixed amount of labor income from taxation, where the same amount is 
subtracted when the market power is removed, the government budget constraint becomes identical to 
the case with proportional taxation. Hence, the welfare cost of market power would be identical to the 
case with proportional taxation in such a system.     
4.5 Distortions when monopoly profit is taxed with a lower rate 
The effective tax rate of capital income is lower than the effective tax rate on labor income in most 
countries. Removal of market power will extend the labor income tax base at the expense of the 
monopoly profit tax base. This effect contributes to increase tax revenue collected by the governments 
in the case where labor income is taxed with a higher rate than capital income. Hence, this effect 
contributes to lower the tax rate on labor income when tax revenue collected is preserved and market 
power is removed. Consequently, the welfare cost of market power is likely to be larger in this case. 
The welfare cost of market power is calculated in a case where the tax rate on monopoly profit is set to 
zero to quantify the maximum potential welfare cost of market power in a setting with a lower tax rate 
on capital income. The government budget constraint is altered to  
(34)  2(1 ) ′′′′′′− =m n L m L , 
where ′′′m  is the tax rate when the market power is removed and 2′′′L  is the supply of labor.  
 
The subsequent supply of labor is given by  
(35)  2 (1 )µ β′′′ ′′′= + −L m . 
The government budget requirement, (34), and the labor supply curve, (35), determines 2′′′L  and ′′′m . 
Note that the initial labor supply, L , equals 100. By inserting for 2′′′L  from (35) into (34) gives 
(36)  2( ) ( ) (1 ) 0β µ β′′′ ′′′− + + − =m m m n L . 
The value of ′′′m  that solves this equation is inserted into the labor supply curve, (35), to 
determine 2′′′L . The welfare cost of market power due to distortions in the labor market is determined 
by the same procedure as in section 4.1. Results are reported in table 4. 
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Table 4.  The Welfare cost created by distortions in the supply of labor (measured as a 
percentage of GNP). Monopoly profit exempted from taxation 
M 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 
C       
10 0.620 3.302 7.239 12.183 18.760 28.118 
15 0.634 3.384 7.434 12.551 19.413 29.292 
20 0.648 3.467 7.633 12.929 20.095 30.542 
25 0.662 3.551 7.836 13.320 20.811 31.878 
30 0.677 3.636 8.043 13.724 21.562 33.308 
35 0.691 3.721 8.255 14.142 22.351  
40 0.706 3.807 8.471 14.574   
50 0.736 3.982 8.916    
60 0.766 4.160 9.381    
 
When the firm level markup factor is between 0,1 and 0,15, the welfare cost spans from 7.2 to 14.6 
percent of GNP when the extent of monopoly in the consumer good sectors (C) is below 40. The 
minimum welfare cost when the firm level markup factor is only 5 percent, is 3.3 percent of GNP.  
 
When the firm level markup factor equals 10 percent and C equals 40, the welfare cost equals 6.0 
percent of GNP with uniform taxation of all income, and approximately 8.5 percent of GNP when 
monopoly profit is exempted from taxation. When the market power is removed in the case where 
monopoly profit is untaxed (table 4), the tax base is effectively extended to all income, as the untaxed 
monopoly income is removed. This extension of the tax base contributes to reduce the tax rate 
required to preserve tax revenue when the market power is removed. The removal of market power 
also leads to a higher pre tax wage rate, which also contributes to reduce the tax rate needed to 
preserve tax revenue. The reduction in the tax rate contributes to generate a welfare gain, as the wedge 
in the labor market is reduced. This effect contributes to increase the welfare cost of market power, as 
more is gained by removing the market power. When the market power is removed in the case where 
all income is taxed (table 2), the tax base is not effectively extended to all income, as monopoly 
income is already taxed in this case. Hence, the tax rate reduction required to preserve tax revenue 
when market power is removed is smaller in this case. Hence, the welfare cost of market power is 
smaller in the case where all income is taxed. An alternative intuition for this result is that the welfare 
cost of market power is smaller in the case where all income is taxed, because taxation of monopoly 
profit does not distort the economy. Browning (1997) finds similar effects of introducing taxation of 
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monopoly profit. The welfare cost of monopoly power is approximately halved when taxation of 
monopoly profit is included in his study.  
 
The welfare costs of the labor supply distortion in Browning (1997) are reported in table 5. These 
welfare costs are equivalent to a case where intermediate good firms do not possess any market power, 
and sell products at unit cost.  
 
Table 5.  The Welfare cost created by distortions in the supply of labor (measured as a 
percentage of GNP). Monopoly profit exempted from taxation. Market power only in 
consumer good firms 
M 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 
C       
10 0.027 0.140 0.270 0.389 0.500 0.602 
15 0.040 0.211 0.408 0.590 0.760 0.918 
20 0.054 0.283 0.547 0.795 1.026 1.243 
25 0.068 0.355 0.689 1.004 1.301 1.580 
30 0.082 0.428 0.834 1.218 1.583 1.929 
35 0.096 0.501 0.980 1.438 1.874  
40 0.110 0.575 1.129 1.662   
50 0.139 0.724 1.434    
60 0.169 0.876 1.750    
 
A comparison of table 5 and table 4 shows that the welfare cost of market power possessed by 
intermediate good firms is substantial compared to the welfare cost without market power possessed 
by intermediate good firms. When e.g. the markup factor equals 0.1 and C equals 40, the welfare cost 
is 7.5 times larger when there is market power possessed by intermediate good firms. These results 
suggest that the literature has seriously underestimated the welfare cost of market power in product 
markets.    
5. Sensitivity tests 
The choice of parameter values in this study is based on rough estimates that are implemented into a 
simple model framework. These estimates can be criticized for being uncertain, and hence, that the 
welfare costs derived in this study is based on uncertain parameter values. Some of the uncertainty is 
connected to the interpretation of the parameters in the simplified framework used. The effect of 
uncertain parameter values is analyzed by conducting a series of sensitivity tests. The subsequent 
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sensitivity tests are conducted in a base line scenario where all income is taxed by 43 percent, the 
markup factor (M) equals 0,1, and C equals 40.  
5.1 The tax wedge in the labor market  
The initial tax wedge in the labor market is crucial for the determination of the welfare cost of market 
power. The quantification of this wedge requires some discussion, as the simple framework used 
excludes some important factors. The previous sections assume that the initial tax wedge in the labor 
market equals 0.43, which is the main parameter value used in Browning (1997). His choice of 
parameter value is based on a discussion in Browning (1987). Browning (1997) also present a case 
where the initial tax rate is increased to 0.5, as factors like non-violent crimes against businesses, 
union power, international trade restrictions, pollution control and federal regulations of businesses 
constitute a wedge of around 15 percent of the wage rate in the US economy, see Browning (1994). 
On the other hand, rivalry related to preference for relative consumption, Frank (2005), and 
unforeseen habits of consumption, contributes to expand the supply of labor. Layard (2002) argues 
that the tax rate on labor income should be 60 percent to correct for these distortions. Negative 
external effects connected to pollution may also justify some indirect taxation of consumption, and 
hence, reduce the supply of labor. Also, the welfare cost connected to distortions in the supply of labor 
is likely to be traded for welfare gains connected to redistribution of income from rich to poor. Such 
gains are not included into the simple framework used in this study. The arguments above suggest that 
a sensitivity test is needed to incorporate an initial tax rate that covers these aspects.        
 
When the initial tax rate, m, is increased by 10 percentage points from 43 to 53 percent, the welfare 
cost of market power due to distortions in the labor market increases from 6.0 to 8.4 percent of GNP. 
When the initial tax rate is reduced to 33 percent, the welfare cost is reduced to 4.4 percent of GNP. 
When the initial tax rate is set to only 10 percent, the welfare cost is reduced to 2.0 percent of GNP. 
The initial effective tax wedge on labor income is clearly a crucial parameter for the welfare cost of 
market power, as in Browning (1997).      
5.2 The extent of market power in intermediate good markets  
The calculations in the previous sections assume that all intermediate goods firms possess the same 
degree of market power. This assumption generated a wedge in the labor market equivalent to n in 
equation (24). However, the empirical justification for this assumption, and the rough estimate of the 
wage share, α , suggest that (24) should be interpreted as a rough estimate. A sensitivity test is 
conducted to illuminate on the case where the extent of market power in intermediate good firms is 
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reduced. When the extent of market power is reduced by increasing α  to ½ , the wedge created in 
equation (24) is changed to   
(37)  
100
MX
n M′′ = +  
This new wedge leads to a welfare cost of 2.9 percent of GNP. The estimate given in section 4.3 is 6.0 
percent of GNP. Hence, lowering the accumulated markup wedge reduces the welfare cost of market 
power.   
 
On the other hand, the extent of market power might be underestimated in the previous sections. First, 
firms sometimes operate with excess capacity due to e.g. a recession in the economy. The excess 
capacity implies that the cost of producing an extra unit becomes marginal from a social planners point 
of view. Consequently, the markup factor between the price and the unit cost becomes substantial in 
this situation. Second, the price of a product in equation (4) was found by adding a markup factor, M, 
to the unit cost. However, a change from additive to proportional markup pricing changes equation (4) 
to  
(38)  ii cMp )1( +=   
When α  equals 1/3, and M equals 0.1, the price of the final product, X, becomes 1.375w. Hence, the 
accumulated markup factor is almost 4 times larger than the firm level markup factor, while the 
accumulated markup factor is 3 times larger in equation (11). A sensitivity test of a case where the 
wedge in equation (24) is replaced by   
(39)  3
100
MX
n M′′′ = + , 
shows that the welfare cost of labor market distortions amounts to 10.4 percent of GNP. The extent of 
market power in intermediate goods firms is clearly a crucial factor for the welfare cost of market 
power.     
5.3 The labor supply elasticity   
The previous sections assume that the compensated labor supply elasticity, η , equals 0,3. However, 
different empirical studies report different elasticity's. A sensitivity test shows that the labor supply 
elasticity is a crucial parameter for the welfare cost of market power.  
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Table 6.  The Welfare cost created by distortions in the supply of labor (measured as a 
percentage of GNP) for different elasticity's 
The compensated labor supply elasticity, η  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
The welfare cost of market power 1.7 3.7 6.0 8.7 
 
6. Conclusion  
This study quantifies the welfare cost of market power in product markets. Previous studies have 
neglected to consider crucial features of market power possessed by intermediate goods firms. The 
market power possessed by intermediate good firms contributes to increase the wedge between the 
marginal product of labor, and the wage rate received by workers. The welfare cost generated by this 
increase is substantial due to a large initial tax wedge in the labor market. The welfare cost of market 
power created by distortions in the supply of labor is found to be more than 40 times larger than the 
welfare cost of distortions in the allocation of consumer goods created by differences in market power 
of firms. The welfare cost of market power possessed by consumer good firms created by distortions 
in the supply of labor is found to be 5-15 times larger than the welfare cost created by distortions in 
the allocation of consumer goods in Browning (1997). Browning (1997), however, does not consider 
market power possessed by intermediate good producers, and hence, neglects to incorporate the wedge 
created by market power of intermediate good firms. This study shows that the welfare cost of market 
power is substantial compared to previous estimates.  
 
Market power in product markets is likely to generate both costs and gains that are not considered in 
this study. Costs connected to rent-seeking behavior to capture a monopoly profit, or costs connected 
to slack or x-inefficiency within monopoly firms, are not considered. Such costs contribute to increase 
the welfare cost of market power. However, monopoly profit is a crucial incentive for R&D activities, 
and hence, innovations within the private sector (see Schumpeter, 1934). Gains connected to such 
activities are not considered in this study. The study was confined to assess the welfare cost created by 
distortions in the allocation of consumer goods, and in the supply of labor.    
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